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Secrecy and Intelligence: Introduction
Kathleen M. Vogel1 and  Brian Balmer2
Abstract
The catalyst for this special issue of Secrecy and Society stems from a 
workshop titled “Secrecy and Intelligence: Opening the Black Box” at 
North Carolina State University, April, 2016. This workshop brought 
together interested scholars, intelligence practitioners, and civil society
members from the United States and Europe to discuss how different 
facets of secrecy and other practices shape the production of 
knowledge in intelligence work. This dialogue aimed to be reflective on
how the closed social worlds of intelligence shape what intelligence 
actors and intelligence analysts, who include those within the 
intelligence establishment and those on the outside, know about 
security threats and the practice of intelligence. The papers in this 
special issue reflect conversations that occurred during and after the 
workshop.
Keywords 
epistemology, intelligence, knowledge production, secrecy, 
transparency
In her inaugural editorial for this journal, Susan Maret (2016) 
convincingly argues that secrecy should be treated as both a social 
problem and a wicked problem. It is a problematic condition that 
demands action; it is complex and exceedingly difficult to resolve. This
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special edition on Secrecy and Intelligence introduces two further 
dimensions for characterising secrecy. Reflecting the guest editors’ 
shared background in Science and Technology Studies (STS), we 
would characterise secrecy as a profoundly epistemic problem. 
Moreover, for all scholars of secrecy, we suggest secrecy presents 
itself as a difficult methodological problem.
The epistemic problem of secrecy is easily stated: Secrets are 
knowledge, and secrecy fundamentally involves asymmetries in 
knowledge. For a secret to exist, someone (or something, if we want 
to extend our analysis to computers, "secrets of the universe," or 
other such entities) has to know that secret, and others must be 
excluded from that knowledge. Indeed, historian Peter Galison has 
argued that secrecy, as the removal of knowledge, should be described
as anti-epistemology, although this belies the fact that, though hidden,
someone still is in possession of the concealed knowledge (Galison 
2004). And, for them, secrecy remains a matter of epistemology.
Secrecy, however, is about far more than disembodied 
knowledge sitting in some people’s heads and not in others. When 
secrets are produced, maintained, and revealed, they have multiple 
facets, including an ethics, a geography, a sociology, and a history.3 
The ethics of secrecy, as explored in the classic study by Sissela Bok 
3  This list is not intended to be exhaustive. One can imagine fruitful potential for 
studies of the political economic, socio-legal, and anthropological dimensions of 
secrecy, and so on.
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(1989), takes an explicitly normative approach and asks: When is it 
right to keep or reveal secrets? Indeed, this is probably the most 
familiar way in which academics have tackled the issue of secrecy.
But secrecy also has a significant geographical element. It might 
seem trivial to state that secrecy takes place somewhere. But, as 
geographer Trevor Paglen points out, this statement draws attention to
the materiality of secrets as a key reason why they generate 
paradoxes and contradictions:
Secret relations, programs, sites, and events have to be made 
out of the same ‘stuff’ that everything else (the nonsecret world)
is made of. Because there are no such things as invisible 
factories, airplanes made out of unearthly ghost-matter...logics 
of secrecy are contradicted by their material implementations. 
(Paglen 2010, 760)
For Paglen, the very effort of people trying to make and keep 
secrets, by getting things and people to behave "as if" they were 
invisible or intangible, will always be betrayed by the plain fact that 
they are not so. Of significance for scholars of secrecy, this work and 
effort of creating and maintaining the secret in the face of such 
internal tensions is itself open to empirical social scientific 
investigation. Rather than focussing solely on the normative questions,
which are of course important, Paglen’s claims shift analytical focus to 
the social processes and dynamics of secrecy. We can ask: How does 
secrecy operate, and what are the consequences of that secrecy?
3
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These discussions of secrecy are central to discussions of 
intelligence and how knowledge is produced within and by intelligence 
communities. This special issue takes a special look at the often 
fraught relationship of secrecy, transparency, and intelligence. We do 
this through close engagement with individuals who have either spent 
time working within the intelligence community, or who have spent 
time closely researching and analysing these secret communities. We 
were motivated to create this special issue based on a series of events 
in the United States and the United Kingdom that have allowed us to 
open up the “black box” of intelligence at this opportune time.
Significantly, a major impetus came from within the usually 
closed world of the U.S. Intelligence community. With the noted 
intelligence failures prior to the September 11th attacks and the 2003 
Iraq War (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 
States 2004; Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United
States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction 2005), the U.S. 
intelligence community has recognized the need to acquire new 
outside expertise to mitigate future intelligence failures. In 2008, the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued Intelligence 
Community Directive Number 205, “Analytic Outreach,” which charges 
intelligence analysts to “leverage outside expertise as part of their 
work…[and]…explore ideas and alternative perspectives, gain new 
4
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insights, generate new knowledge, or obtain new information” (Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence 2008). The Directive recognizes
the importance for analysts to move out of their classified domains in 
order to tap into valuable outside knowledge and expertise relevant to 
intelligence problems, and that can challenge the erroneous group-
think that can occur in the closed worlds of intelligence. Furthermore, 
a collection of current and former intelligence practitioners have 
published articles discussing facets of knowledge production in 
intelligence and how this kind of inquiry can suggest improvements for
intelligence collection, analysis, and policymaking (Fingar 2011; 
George and Bruce 2008; Miller 2008; Treverton 2008; Kerr et al. 
2005; Johnston 2005; Rieber and Thomason 2005).
The WikiLeaks and Snowden affair have made more apparent the
vast scale and scope of the U.S. intelligence industrial complex 
(Macaksill and Dance 2013; Priest and Arkin 2012). Snowden has also 
attracted academic interest from scholars in the relationship between 
secrecy and forms on non-knowledge, such as ignorance (Rappert and 
Balmer 2015a). The Snowden revelations, in particular, have drawn 
back the shroud on U.S. intelligence for public scrutiny, and raised 
troubling questions about what these secret communities are doing 
and what levels of oversight are needed for how these communities 
produce knowledge. 
5
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To take advantage of this unique moment - and what served as 
the catalyst for this special issue - we organized a workshop in April 
2016 called “Secrecy and Intelligence: Opening the Black Box” at 
North Carolina State University.4 This workshop brought together 
interested scholars, intelligence practitioners, and civil society 
members from the United States and Europe to discuss how different 
facets of secrecy and other practices shape the production of 
knowledge in intelligence work. This dialogue aimed to be reflective on
how the closed social worlds of intelligence shape what intelligence 
actors and intelligence analysts, who include those within the 
intelligence establishment and those on the outside, know about 
security threats and the practice of intelligence. We were motivated to 
engage with practitioners in both the U.K. and U.S. intelligence 
communities in this context, out of curiosity regarding its function as 
an analytic object of study, to learn what such encounters can tell us 
about this secret community and how it produces security knowledge, 
and to observe and document the effects of intelligence on S&TS and 
public spheres (Vogel and Dennis 2018).
In addition to the paper presentations at the workshop (some of 
which are presented in expanded form here), there was also the 
4  The workshop was funded by the National Science Foundation, the Defense 
Intelligence Agency Intelligence Community Center for Academic Excellence (IC-
CAE), the Laboratory for Analytic Sciences, the Kenan Institute for Engineering, 
Technology, and Science, the Buchdahl Lecture Fund, and NC State.
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opportunity for participants to “witness” the workings of a real-life 
intelligence research laboratory as part of the workshop activities. The 
National Security Agency’s Laboratory for Analytic Sciences (LAS), 
located at NC State, agreed to open its doors to our workshop 
participants. The LAS is a big data research center that aims to 
produce technology and tradecraft to improve intelligence analysis for 
the future.5  This opportunity provided a rare moment to witness the 
tensions between secrecy and transparency - and the awkward 
encounters of how members of the U.S. intelligence community and 
the workshop participants tried to navigate these terrains.
For U.S. citizens at the workshop, the LAS organized a tour of 
the sensitive compartmented information facility (SCIF), which was the
classified space on the NC State campus in which NSA analysts could 
work. To obtain access to the SCIF, each person was required to 
submit their name, date of birth, and social security information so 
that a background check could be run. Non-U.S. citizens were not 
allowed into the SCIF but were given the opportunity to see demos of 
some of the unclassified technology prototypes, offsite in classrooms 
on the NC State campus, that were being developed by the LAS. What 
was interesting, and reflective of the spirit of the workshop, was the 
ironic and unexpected encounter of secrecy and transparency during 
the tour and demos. The U.S. citizens who were allowed access into 
5  At https://ncsu-las.org/
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the SCIF - the seeming “crown jewels” of the LAS enterprise - felt that 
they were given long and drawn-out canned PowerPoint lectures about
LAS, with very little time to tour the facility and ask open-ended 
questions about the work done there. This was certainly not 
deliberate. Although the LAS leadership felt they were being very 
transparent by letting members of the uncleared public into the SCIF 
(at that time, there had not been such a large group of the public 
allowed into the LAS SCIF) and providing background information on 
the lab, this was not perceived by the U.S. participants. In contrast, 
the foreign participants at the workshop felt they received a lot of 
information, openness, and transparency about the technological tools 
being developed at LAS, as they were able to see and touch the demos
(held in campus rooms outside of SCIF), and found them to include a 
very worthwhile set of presentations - this even though the foreigners 
were shunned from visiting the SCIF. We recount this anecdote not to 
criticise the lab; rather, these experiences reveal the interesting and 
often contradictory tensions that exist within notions of secrecy and 
transparency in matters of intelligence.
As a small reminder from this encounter, and from our years of 
research involving interviews with intelligence practitioners and 
historical research on formerly classified national security materials, 
we have become sensitized to the disconnects among academic, 
8
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intelligence, and civil society communities, and the need for more 
substantive and extended discussions among them to better 
understand the production of knowledge in intelligence, and how the 
work and sustained interactions from these disparate communities can
beneficially inform one another. Beyond the workshop, we hope this 
special issue is one way forward to create a constructive space for this 
kind of dialogue and engagement to continue.
The series of papers in this volume speak to a variety of facets 
of secrecy (and its twin, transparency), and how they operate within 
and across different facets of intelligence activities, programs, 
agendas, and agencies.
The history of secrecy is equally pertinent to our special edition, 
with a number of contributors reflecting on their contribution to the 
historiography of intelligence. It is important here to understand 
secrecy as a phenomenon that changes over time. As such, historian 
Alex Wellerstein has argued that although all societies experience 
secrecy in some form or another, the organization of secrecy (and 
transparency) and the targets of concern around secrets are products 
of historical context. Placing the origins of contemporary 
manifestations of U.S. concerns about secrets as far back as WWI, he 
claims:
American secrecy is relatively new (early-to-mid 20th century 
forward)… it had a few definite points of beginning, that the 
9
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assumption that the world was full of increasingly dangerous 
information that needed government regulation was not a 
timeless one, and that it had changed over time in a variety of 
distinct and important ways. (Wellerstein 2016)
Approaching these different facets of secrecy and society raises 
adjunct issues around methodology and researching secrecy. In 
thinking through the most appropriate ways to investigate secrecy, 
there is an overarching question about whether research on secrets is 
different in degree or kind from other topics of social research (e.g., 
Rappert and Balmer 2007, 2015a, 2015b). On the one hand, resolving 
problems of access, trust, veracity, and interpretation are pervasive 
across many forms of social research and are featured in any good 
methods textbook. It remains an open question as to whether research
into secrets demands fundamentally different approaches. It is clear 
that the problems listed above are exacerbated in situations in which 
secrecy is endemic, institutionally embedded, and even part of the 
raison d’etre of the organisation, group, or individual being studied. It 
is worth noting here that several contributions to this volume are 
personal reflections on researching secrecy and intelligence, rather 
than traditional academic articles reporting research results (see 
Goodman, Nolan, and Räsänen). We regard these contributions as 
providing crucial preliminary steps to building a more systematic and 
rigorous methodological literature on this topic.
10
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In this collection, three historians – Goodman, Macrakis, and 
Walton - reflect on their research into the secret world of intelligence. 
Each has a different experience of accessing sources, ranging from 
Goodman - writing an official history of the UK Joint Intelligence 
Committee and therefore with what he calls “unparalleled access” - to 
Walton - relying on newly declassified documents - and Macrakis, who 
used both oral history and archival analysis to understand the history 
of intelligence. Even Goodman, who had the most access, raises the 
"equal and opposite" problem of having too much information to sift 
through. He also points out that having such access poses questions 
about credibility; readers of his work need to be in a position to trust 
his account based on documents that cannot be checked 
independently. So, rather than a simple polarisation between 
concealment and revelation, even writing about secrecy creates 
asymmetries of knowledge that, prima facie, a historical account aims 
to dissolve. 
All three historians raise a different issue linked to earlier 
discussion of the geography of secrecy. None was uncovering a single 
secret locked in a safe somewhere. Macrakis notes the long, slow 
process involved in piecing together different archival and oral 
sources, with the best material not necessarily where it was expected 
to be. Goodman notes that the record of the Joint Intelligence 
11
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Committee consists of years of paperwork in different formats: 
minutes, memoranda, confidential annexes, tactical assessments, and 
suchlike. Echoing Paglen’s point about the materiality of secrecy 
creating contradictions, Walton notes how a “mislaid” archive of 8,000 
files, taking up 15 miles of shelving, on colonial Kenya could not 
remain lost (short of being destroyed). Local residents near the 
archive even referred to the site as “spook central.” 
Some of the papers also examine the larger macro-level political 
context and the larger political forces that support and sustain, as well 
as attempt to subvert, secrecy and transparency within intelligence. 
Miles follows the unresolved U.S. political debate about whether to 
continue to classify or disclose more details about the U.S. intelligence 
budget; supporters and critics both deploy arguments involving the 
U.S. Constitution, the need for public accountability, and security to 
rationalize their positions - the debates over secrecy and transparency 
in U.S. intelligence have a longstanding, and unresolved, political 
rhetoric behind them dating back to the 1970s. Beyond disclosing top-
line intelligence budget figures, the U.S. Congress continues to wrestle
with whether to disclose more intelligence budget information as a way
to strengthen and support U.S. intelligence, or whether this will 
introduce dangerous threats to U.S. national security. 
12
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In contrast to Miles, where the political debate over the U.S. 
intelligence budget remains stalled, McDermott’s article shows how 
such debate can be ruptured - by outsiders such as Edward Snowden, 
the media, and other civil society actors working through public 
disclosures and FOIA litigation. McDermott painstakingly details how, 
since September 11, 2001, the U.S. intelligence community has been 
able to obtain intelligence from emails, text, video chats, and 
photographs on potential U.S. national security threats through a 
variety of technologically mediated means - for example, servers of 
U.S. companies such as Microsoft, Yahoo, Skype, Google, and 
Facebook. This data has been enabled by a series of secret U.S. courts
(whose data and decisions are classified and not open to public 
scrutiny), and who become the ultimate arbiter on what is allowable 
for surveillance by U.S. intelligence. McDermott argues that the 
obligation of these courts and members of the U.S. intelligence 
community to protect intelligence sources, methods, and activities - 
without a clear legal definition of methods - allows for the intelligence 
community to create broad swaths of boundaries around what is 
withheld from public purview. However, McDermott notes that this 
very practice of expanding the boundaries of what is considered to be 
classified is recognized as being contrary to building public trust in 
intelligence, which is seen as essential to mission success. The 
13
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protective features of transparency seem to be irreconcilable with the 
inherent tendency by U.S. intelligence to classify sources and 
methods. 
Albro’s article examines the problem of information secrecy by 
unpacking the opacity of “black box,” algorithm-based, big-data tools 
that are being developed by certain U.S. intelligence agencies to study
and anticipate the behavior of foreign cultures that are of concern to 
U.S. national security. Albro argues that these technological tools are 
creating new regimes of secrecy that are obscuring the collection 
process from analysts; this opacity increases the risk of data distortion
and analysts thereby fundamentally misunderstanding the behavior of 
cultural groups, which can lead to poor national security assessments 
and policymaking.
Writing from the personal perspective of serving as a former 
intelligence practitioner and simultaneously as sociology graduate 
student conducting an ethnography of an intelligence agency, Nolan 
advances the idea of “boundary personnel” - people who navigate 
between the worlds of academia and national security - and how they 
provide value added in revealing the unique facets of tacit knowledge 
that encompasses intelligence work that outside researchers would not
be able to access. At the same time, Nolan documents the inherent 
challenges facing such boundary workers and how the secrecy that 
14
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surrounds intelligence work even permeates the mundane aspects of 
work life, at times creating social distance among its employees, 
creating new forms of invisible labor to maintain secrecy, and 
producing distorting effects on the work - not only as a practitioner, 
but also as a research ethnographer. Nolan makes the case for the 
need for more of these boundary personnel within intelligence 
organizations, so we can better understand how these complex centers
of power and knowledge production operate.
In a similar vein, Räsänen offers a methodological reflection on 
her qualitative fieldwork within the Swedish intelligence community as 
a form of collaboration. Unlike some traditional ethnographies in which
the researcher is a distanced observer of the ethnographic site, 
Räsänen worked in partnership with the organisation with the explicit 
aim of bringing about change. As she notes: "Practitioners learn about 
the research process as the researchers learn about the practitioners’ 
work practices. Rather than just passing over information to the 
researcher, the practitioner works with them in knowledge 
generation." Such co-production also meant that the object of research
itself changed over the course of the fieldwork as a direct result of 
carrying out the research. As with Nolan, this type of subject-
researcher relationship is not without challenges – not least in how the
researcher maintains some critical distance - but Räsänen concludes 
15
Vogel and Balmer: Secrecy and Intelligence: Introduction
Published by SJSU ScholarWorks, 2018
that, on balance, the time and energy expended was beneficial to both
the practitioners and the academic researchers.
This project advances knowledge in the field of secrecy studies, 
science and technology studies, and related disciplines by examining 
the different geographies and practices of knowledge in the secret 
worlds of intelligence, and how to study them using different analytic 
methodologies and ethical sensibilities. As we see signs that the 
previously closed worlds of intelligence are becoming at least slightly 
more open, we hope that this special issue is just the start of more 
dialogues around these topics.
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